Index

Zimbabwe: Injustice & Political Reconciliation
Edited by Brian Raftopoulos & Tyrone Savage
2005: 205 x 135 mm; 296pp
ISBN 1 77922 025 1

Reviewer: Stewart Musiwa

A FAILED RECONCILIATION

At independence in 1980 President Robert Mugabe announced a policy of reconciliation that promised to bring about political, racial and tribal harmony as a precondition for rebuilding war-shattered Zimbabwe. This did not fail to impress both the local and international observers, who praised him as an embodiment of some of the finest qualities of statesmanship in Africa. Yet sooner rather than later, horror stories of army brutality against innocent civilians in the early 1980s and the resurgence of violence in 2000 enabled the world to see beyond this façade of magnanimity a power-hungry Mugabe building not a prosperous nation but an authoritarian state out of the ruins of Rhodesia.

The fact that he inherited rather than destroyed the authoritarian state reflects his ambivalence towards the system he sought to destroy. He seemed to be rebelling against the colonial system yet at the same time identifying with the aggressor by retaining and fine-tuning some of the most repressive Rhodesian laws and everything to do with the colonial autocratic style of governance.

The book points out how this inherited authoritarianism found its first practical application in the form of Gukurahundi, an orgy of killings of Matebeleland civilians that were perpetrated by government militias, ostensibly to flush out dissidents. After Gukurahundi, state authoritarianism tactically buried its ugly head in the sands of the faked Unity Accord of 1987, but resurfaced in 2000 after ZANU(PF)’s defeat in the constitutional referendum. The Unity Accord produced a form of reconciliation that killed a major opposition party of the time, PF Zapu, and relegated Matebeleland to such a marginal position that it got little attention in national development projects. That is why Teresa Barnes, one of the authors in this volume and a Western Cape University Lecturer, argues that reconciliation has been used by the Zanu(PF) government to put major opposition parties into subordination. Shari Eppel, a human rights activist, concurs with Barnes, arguing that the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987 was followed by the creation of a de facto one-party state. She argues that the amnesty of the following year seemed to benefit mainly the dissidents rather than victims of Gukurahundi who were not compensated.

Despite all its attempts to suppress major opposition parties and civil society, the Zanu(PF) government faced increasing pressure towards the end of the 20th Century, with the emergence of the major opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and other civic organisations. During this period, the MDC, local and international civic and other organisations came together to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. Between 1998 and 2000 a major constitutional debate took place in Zimbabwe. The ruling Zanu(PF) used its defeat in the constitutional referendum of 2000 to revert to its authoritarian form of using violence and anti-imperialist rhetoric to mobilize both local and regional support. The rhetoric, especially when used by skilled demagogues like Mugabe, has indeed had great resonance nationally, regionally and to some extent, internationally. An immediate effect of this nationalist revival was social polarization along racial, political and ideological lines. A further negative effect has been the exclusion of racial minorities who are left without a place in post–colonial Zimbabwe, an attitude that has helped dampen the spirit of reconciliation.

On the reconciliation of war veterans, Paul Themba Nyathi argues that the government has failed to meaningfully integrate war veterans into the mainstream of society. The one-off benefits they were offered did not sustain them. Owing to their vulnerable position, most of the war veterans have been reduced to a reserve army that the Zanu PF government can use at will to perpetrate violence against innocent civilians.

Wallace Chuma, a media analyst, underscores the important role that the media can play in the transformation of Zimbabwe’s political and economic landscape, thereby bringing true justice and reconciliation.

Most of the authors whose articles make up this 296-page book agree that Mugabe’s reconciliation policy was hollow in as far as it failed to address the fundamental question of justice. The Lancaster House Constitution of 1979 that gave him the political power he so badly craved for was a serious blow to justice. It was designed to delay the land reform by a decade. This meant that structural injustice in colonial land ownership patterns – the main reason why the liberation war was fought – were not fundamental issues to be tackled at the time as they were perceived as counter to the spirit of reconciliation.

The authors of this volume discuss in different ways how this wrong conception of reconciliation has led to the Zimbabwe crisis. A solution out of this crisis begins with a redefinition of reconciliation. Reconciliation and justice need to be inextricably linked. Spurred on by this conviction, the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation has initiated a project to facilitate dialogue among analysts on the Zimbabwean crisis with a view to finding ways to justice, reconciliation and peace. Many of the analysts argue that as long as Zimbabwe remains polarised along political, racial and tribal lines there will be no unity of purpose. The spirit of this book is one of dialogue. The analysts have begun the dialogue by suggesting possible ways out of the Zimbabwe crisis. Although by no means exhaustive, this collection of articles is comprehensive in the sense that the articles cover all areas of life that need reconciliation. In broad terms, these areas are expressed in political, racial, and tribal relations that Zimbabweans enter into everyday. Lloyd Sachikonye, a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Development Studies, suggests that the victims of the land reform be compensated, in the same way, one can add, as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace called for the compensation of Gukurahundi victims by the government. However, Deprose Muchena, while somewhat pessimistic about the Church’s ability under current Zimbabwe conditions to influence positive change, believes it has the potential to do so when opportunity arises.

For Brian Kagoro, a lawyer, ‘a participatory constitution-making process is a means of moving towards national reconciliation’. Like most of the authors in this book, he locates the roots of the Zimbabwean Crisis in colonial structures that Zanu(PF) leaders have not changed but used to their advantage.

Some analysts have stressed the role of regional players in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis. South Africa as a strong SADC partner has to be looked up to as a possible mediator in dialogue between Zanu(PF) and the MDC. However Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” has tended to shatter these hopes, much to the disappointment of Zimbabweans and the international partners alike. However practical solutions out of the Zimbabwe crisis should come from Zimbabweans themselves. The various viewpoints covered in this book are meant to stimulate further debate on the subject.

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